Militant competition: how terrorists and insurgents advertise with violence and how they can be stopped

Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:  
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Conrad, Justin (VerfasserIn)
Beteiligte: Spaniel, William
Medienart: Druck Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge New York, NY Port Melbourne New Delhi Singapore Cambridge University Press 2021
In:Jahr: 2021
Online-Zugang: Inhaltsverzeichnis
Klappentext
Bestand in Tübingen:In Tübingen vorhanden.
UB: KB 21 A 1580
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
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Schlagwörter:
Terrorism > Public opinion
Terrorism > Decision making > Mathematical models
Terrorist organizations > Public opinion
Political Violence > Public opinion
Political Violence > Decision making > Mathematical models
Terrorism > Prevention > Social aspects
Competition
Endogenous growth (Economics)
Terrorismus
Rebell
Konkurrent
Finanzierung
Gewalt
Spaltung
Fallstudie
Statistische Analyse
POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and test the model's implications with statistical analysis and case studies. A series of model extensions allow the authors to incorporate the full range of strategic actors, focusing in particular on government efforts to counter and deter violence. The results indicate that the direct effects of competition are not as clear as they may seem, and interventions to alter competitive incentives may backfire if states are not careful. This is a timely contribution to a growing body of political economy research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence.
Beschreibung:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 239-255, Register
Physische Details:ix, 262 Seiten, Diagramme
ISBN:9781108834186
9781108994538