Militant competition: how terrorists and insurgents advertise with violence and how they can be stopped
Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and...
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| Tipo de documento: | Print Libro |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge New York, NY Port Melbourne New Delhi Singapore
Cambridge University Press
2021
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| En: | Año: 2021 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Índice Texto de la solapa |
| Disponibilidad en Tübingen: | Disponible en Tübingen. UB: KB 21 A 1580 |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Servicio de pedido Subito: | Pedir ahora. |
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| Sumario: | Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and test the model's implications with statistical analysis and case studies. A series of model extensions allow the authors to incorporate the full range of strategic actors, focusing in particular on government efforts to counter and deter violence. The results indicate that the direct effects of competition are not as clear as they may seem, and interventions to alter competitive incentives may backfire if states are not careful. This is a timely contribution to a growing body of political economy research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence. |
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| Notas: | Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 239-255, Register |
| Descripción Física: | ix, 262 Seiten, Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781108834186 9781108994538 |