Transnational corporations and human rights duties: perfect and imperfect
This paper aims, firstly, to bridge debates on human rights and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) within practical philosophy and those within the business and human rights literature and, secondly, to determine the extent to which human rights duties can be assigned to TNCs. To justifiably assign h...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2016
|
| En: |
Human rights review
Año: 2016, Volumen: 17, Número: 4, Páginas: 479-500 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Palabras clave: |
| Sumario: | This paper aims, firstly, to bridge debates on human rights and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) within practical philosophy and those within the business and human rights literature and, secondly, to determine the extent to which human rights duties can be assigned to TNCs. To justifiably assign human rights duties to TNCs, it is argued that these duties need to be grounded in moral theory. Through assessment of two approaches from practical philosophy, it is argued that positive duties cannot be assigned to TNCs because their bindingness cannot be grounded in moral theory. A positive argument is introduced to interpret TNCs’ human rights duties as corresponding to virtues rather than rights. Though such duties are indeterminate regarding what constitutes adequate performance, they can be made more determinate through legal instruments outside of positive human rights law. An approach is introduced exemplifying how such approaches can achieve the end of TNCs compliance with human rights norms. |
|---|---|
| Notas: | Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 499-50 |
| ISSN: | 1874-6306 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s12142-016-0417-3 |
