Regime Type of Foreign Supporters of Resistance Movements and its Impact on State Repression
Does the regime type of a foreign state supporter of a resistance movement influence violent repression by domestic states facing resistance? Studies on resistance movements have recently begun to explore the effects of third-party support on the behaviors and successes of the movements themselves a...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | ; |
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2025
|
| En: |
Terrorism and political violence
Año: 2025, Volumen: 37, Número: 3, Páginas: 332-348 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
|
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Palabras clave: |
| Sumario: | Does the regime type of a foreign state supporter of a resistance movement influence violent repression by domestic states facing resistance? Studies on resistance movements have recently begun to explore the effects of third-party support on the behaviors and successes of the movements themselves and the governments they oppose. While this literature has unearthed important findings on the impact of external interventions on behalf of resistance groups, one area of research that remains unexplored is how the political features of third-party actors shape the behavior of governments that face resistance movements. This study investigates how the domestic political characteristics of foreign supporters of resistance movements affect the repressive behaviors of domestic states facing resistance. Looking specifically at the regime type of foreign state supporters of opposition groups, we argue that resistance movements that receive assistance from democratic foreign states deter domestic governments facing resistance from using violent repression. Such governments recognize the selection effects associated with democratic intervention and the reputational costs associated with human rights practices and thus, they are less likely to commit physical violence against dissidents. Our findings for resistance campaigns during the period of 1981–2013 support our expectations that external support from democratic states for resistance movements reduces the likelihood of domestic governments facing resistance using violent repression against dissident groups. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1556-1836 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09546553.2023.2296512 |