Do Prosecutor Elections Impact Prosecutor Decision Making? An Analysis of Florida Prosecutors
In the United States, the vast majority of chief prosecutors are elected, and existing literature demonstrates that electoral pressure impacts the decisions that candidates make (e.g., Brace & Hall, 1997; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Mayhew, 1974). Prosecutorial discretion puts prosecutors in a un...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2024
|
| En: |
Criminology, criminal justice, law & society
Año: 2024, Volumen: 25, Número: 2, Páginas: 1-17 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
|
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Palabras clave: |
| Sumario: | In the United States, the vast majority of chief prosecutors are elected, and existing literature demonstrates that electoral pressure impacts the decisions that candidates make (e.g., Brace & Hall, 1997; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Mayhew, 1974). Prosecutorial discretion puts prosecutors in a unique position to shape outcomes in our criminal justice system. This paper explores how electoral pressure impacts prosecutorial decision-making. This analysis utilizes a novel dataset of chief prosecutor elections in Florida from 2008–2016 to test the impact of electoral pressure on three dependent variables: the proportion of cases not prosecuted, the proportion of cases convicted by jury trial, and the proportion of cases disposed by plea agreements. The models demonstrate no relationship between electoral pressure and case declination decisions. The results hold across several operationalizations of electoral pressure. However, individual prosecutor characteristics, such as sex and ideology, shape the decision to prosecute. Electoral pressure also has no effect on plea bargaining. However, during the time span of the data, jury trials decrease during election years. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2332-886X |
| DOI: | 10.54555/CCJLS.10853.122094 |
