Integrity, culture, and scale: an empirical test of the big bad police agency

Building on Klockars et. al. (2000) analysis of survey data on police agency integrity, this analysis develops an economic model of police corruption within police agencies. Empirical estimates of the economic model are consistent with Klockars et. al. (2000) in that there is no evidence to support...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Marché, Gary E. 1953- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Published: 2009
In: Crime, law and social change
Year: 2009, Volume: 51, Issue: 5, Pages: 463-486
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Keywords:
Administrative Personnel
Organizational Incentive
Police Agency
Police Culture
Police Officer
Description
Summary:Building on Klockars et. al. (2000) analysis of survey data on police agency integrity, this analysis develops an economic model of police corruption within police agencies. Empirical estimates of the economic model are consistent with Klockars et. al. (2000) in that there is no evidence to support the traditional theory that police agency corruption is attributable to the "individual bad-apple." Independent of other factors, the present analysis shows that police culture fosters corruption. Furthermore, the present analysis shows that incentive structures within police agencies increase the problem of corruption as the scale of police agency operation increases. Policies that would promote higher levels of integrity are considered.
Item Description:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 485-486
ISSN:1573-0751
DOI:10.1007/s10611-008-9184-7