Does illegality breed violence?: drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets

Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may resul...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Snyder, Richard 1967- (VerfasserIn)
Beteiligte: Durán-Martínez, Angélica 1979- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 2009
In: Crime, law and social change
Jahr: 2009, Band: 52, Heft: 3, Seiten: 253-273
Online-Zugang: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Schlagwörter:
Criminal Organization
Drug Trafficking
Homicide Rate
Military Government
Trafficking Organization
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may result from well-meaning policy reforms intended to improve law enforcement, can lead to violence. The cases of drug trafficking in contemporary Mexico and Burma show how a focus on the emergence and breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets helps explain variation in levels of violence both within and across illicit markets.
Beschreibung:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 272-273
ISSN:1573-0751
DOI:10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z