Does illegality breed violence?: drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets

Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may resul...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Snyder, Richard 1967- (Autor) ; Durán-Martínez, Angélica 1979- (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2009
En: Crime, law and social change
Año: 2009, Volumen: 52, Número: 3, Páginas: 253-273
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Palabras clave:
Criminal Organization
Drug Trafficking
Homicide Rate
Military Government
Trafficking Organization
Descripción
Sumario:Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may result from well-meaning policy reforms intended to improve law enforcement, can lead to violence. The cases of drug trafficking in contemporary Mexico and Burma show how a focus on the emergence and breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets helps explain variation in levels of violence both within and across illicit markets.
Notas:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 272-273
ISSN:1573-0751
DOI:10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z