| Summary: | I have two aims in this dissertation. The first is to record an extraordinary period of human rights institution-building in Southeast Asia. This period began in 2007, with the signing of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Charter explicitly links the purpose of ASEAN with the strengthening of democracy and the protection of human rights and provides for the establishment of an ‘ASEAN Human Rights Body’. This body was established in 2009, as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. The Commission’s first task was to draft the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which was completed and adopted by ASEAN Heads of State in November 2012. In the context of the political diversity of Southeast Asia, the region’s historical resistance to international human rights law, and the long shadow cast by the ‘Asian Values’ debate of the 1990s, I ask the following questions: What factors explain the establishment of these institutions? How deep is ASEAN’s new commitment to human rights and democracy? What do these institutions augur for the way rights are realised in Southeast Asia? My second aim is to explore and test my theory that regional institutions possess a particular legitimacy in the promotion and protection of human rights. The theory is driven by a simple observation. Since the end of World War II, the discourse of human rights has become, to borrow a phrase used by Charles Beitz, ‘the common moral language of global society.’ Yet the original post-World War II vision of a legalised international human rights order (with judicial oversight, mechanisms for enforcement, and sanctions for non-compliance) has faded. The global human rights system works by setting standards, which are then invoked (by domestic and international non-governmental organisations, members of civil society, political oppositions, the international community) to persuade, shame or coerce states into compliance. The problems are: change is very slow, many states (both predatory and decent) are resistant to influence, and in circumstances of exception (civil conflict, war, political crisis) when human rights are most vulnerable to abuse, the system is least effective. The failures of the global system are many and patent. On the other hand, states seem more willing to subscribe to binding norms promoted by regional organs of restricted membership. Regional systems now exist under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American States, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States and most recently, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Scholars have observed that there seems to be a ‘directness of association’ between members of regional organisations, which positively influences (or has the potential to influence) causal processes such as socialisation, binding, monitoring and enforcement. My theory is that regional factors such as smaller numbers, deeper levels of integration, greater consensus around the importance of certain societal values, similar geographic characteristics and shared economic and security interests, create the conditions for legitimate governance. I test my theory using a case study of Southeast Asia and its new institutions. In the end, my conclusion is that in circumstances where regions possess low levels of democracy, then regional human rights systems do not possess a particular legitimacy. The nature of democracy, the relationship between democracy and human rights, and the deficit of democracy in Southeast Asia are at the heart of my explanation about why Southeast Asia’s nascent human rights system (currently) lacks legitimacy
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