Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence

The standard economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent (type-I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type-II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, los...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
VerfasserInnen: Luca Stanca (Verfasst von) ; Matteo Rizzolli (Verfasst von)
Medienart: Elektronisch Buch
Sprache:Englisch
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