Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear

In this paper, we develop a simple model of social dynamics governing the evolution of strategic self-protection choices of boundedly rational potential victims facing the threat of prospective offenders in a large population with random matching. We prove that individual (and socially transmitted)...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Angelo Antoci (VerfasserIn)
Beteiligte: Pier Luigi Sacco ; Mauro Sodini
Medienart: Elektronisch Buch
Sprache:Englisch
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