Strategic and transactional costs of corruption: perspectives from Vietnamese firms

Focusing on Vietnam, this article explores what costs and benefits a firm may get when it engages in corrupt activities. The research employs three theoretical perspectives, namely institutional, rent-seeking and resource-based theories, to shed light on different types of costs and benefits of corr...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Thang Van Nguyen (Author) ; Ho, Bao D. (Author) ; Le, Canh Quang (Author) ; Hung Viet Nguyen (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Published: 2016
In: Crime, law and social change
Year: 2016, Volume: 65, Issue: 4/5, Pages: 351-374
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Keywords:
Enterprise Survey
Informal Cost
Informal Payment
Technical Inefficiency
Young Firm
Description
Summary:Focusing on Vietnam, this article explores what costs and benefits a firm may get when it engages in corrupt activities. The research employs three theoretical perspectives, namely institutional, rent-seeking and resource-based theories, to shed light on different types of costs and benefits of corruption at the firm level, using a combination of case studies and quantitative methods. The analysis addresses different types of costs and benefits of corruption for firms. The quantitative analysis (supplemented by qualitative interviews) draws on samples of Vietnamese firms from the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) and the General Statistics Office’s firm surveys in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Results show that firms engage in corrupt activities primarily to follow the ‘rules of the game’. Commonly accepted benefits of corruption such as transactional benefits (i.e., better administrative services) or access to business opportunities hold true only for certain firms. On the other hand, corruption has harmful effects on a firm’s strategic capability by eroding the integrity culture, demotivating innovation and risking the firm’s reputation. These harmful effects are normally hidden and not well-recognized by firms.
Item Description:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 373-374
ISSN:1573-0751
DOI:10.1007/s10611-016-9609-7