Tigers vs. flies: impact of official ranks on judicial trials in PRC’s anti-corruption campaign

Corruption in People’s Republic of China (PRC) has worsened and become widespread and deeply rooted at all levels of the government for decades. Since President Xi Jinping came to power, a new anti-corruption campaign has been waged against both ‘tigers and flies’, and many ‘big tigers’ have been br...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Jiang, Xin (Autor)
Otros Autores: Cui, Shan ; Liang, Bin ; Shuai, Honglan ; Liu, Jianhong
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2023
En: Crime, law and social change
Año: 2023, Volumen: 80, Número: 1, Páginas: 51-78
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Palabras clave:
Administrative ranks
Anti-corruption
China
Judicial trials
Sentencing
Descripción
Sumario:Corruption in People’s Republic of China (PRC) has worsened and become widespread and deeply rooted at all levels of the government for decades. Since President Xi Jinping came to power, a new anti-corruption campaign has been waged against both ‘tigers and flies’, and many ‘big tigers’ have been brought down. The new campaign raises important questions about the efficacy of institutional management and regulations to control corruption. Yet, empirical studies on judicial trials and sentencing of corrupt officials in China are sparse. Based on a random sample of three corruption crimes (misappropriation of public funds, embezzlement, and bribe-taking) adjudicated in 2016, this study empirically examines potential impact of one’s official rank on both judicial processing and sentencing. The results showed that one’s official rank makes potential differences in embezzlement and bribe-taking. In general, higher official rankers are associated with prolonged judicial processing and harsher punishment, which lends support to an exemplary model official theory. This study shed significant light to our understanding of China’s judicial campaign against corruption offenders.
Notas:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 75-77
ISSN:1573-0751
DOI:10.1007/s10611-022-10072-9