Blinding the Elephant: Combat, Information, and Rebel Violence
How does combat affect insurgent violence against civilians? Existing studies emphasize the role of combat outcomes, but have not explored the direct effects of various combat events. This article argues that one such event, government attacks on the rebels, has a positive effect on insurgent violen...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2021
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| In: |
Terrorism and political violence
Year: 2021, Volume: 33, Issue: 7, Pages: 1469-1491 |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Keywords: |
| Summary: | How does combat affect insurgent violence against civilians? Existing studies emphasize the role of combat outcomes, but have not explored the direct effects of various combat events. This article argues that one such event, government attacks on the rebels, has a positive effect on insurgent violence that stems from the logic of guerrilla warfare. In guerrilla wars, government forces tend to rely on informants in finding the insurgents. Their attacks therefore often evince civilian denunciation. To deter future denunciations, the rebels have incentives to subsequently punish the suspected or known denunciator. This argument is probed using detailed original data from Nepal’s Maoist insurgency. A panel analysis shows that government attacks were positively associated with rebel violence against civilians, and especially with violence against suspected informants. Process-tracing evidence further supports the argument, suggesting that the rebels used violence strategically to prevent information leaks and government attacks. |
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| ISSN: | 1556-1836 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09546553.2019.1630383 |
