Violence on the Home Front: Interstate Rivalry and Pro-Government Militias

With an increased focus on the role of pro-government militias in understanding intra-state conflict, scholars have primarily argued that states use militias as a proxy of the government because of low capacity or as a means of avoiding responsibility for violence against civilians. However, states...

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1. VerfasserIn: Akins, Harrison (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 2021
In: Terrorism and political violence
Jahr: 2021, Band: 33, Heft: 3, Seiten: 466-488
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Zusammenfassung:With an increased focus on the role of pro-government militias in understanding intra-state conflict, scholars have primarily argued that states use militias as a proxy of the government because of low capacity or as a means of avoiding responsibility for violence against civilians. However, states with both high capacity and a willingness to commit violence against civilians have also relied upon pro-government militias in counterinsurgency operations. This paper argues that states involved in enduring interstate rivalries are more likely to use pro-government militias in order to reserve conventional military forces for potential conflict with their rival. Based on a case study of India’s Kashmir insurgency and logit analysis of pro-government militia data from 1981 to 2001, the findings provide empirical support for this theory and are robust to alternative measures and model specifications.
ISSN:1556-1836
DOI:10.1080/09546553.2018.1548353