Violence on the Home Front: Interstate Rivalry and Pro-Government Militias
With an increased focus on the role of pro-government militias in understanding intra-state conflict, scholars have primarily argued that states use militias as a proxy of the government because of low capacity or as a means of avoiding responsibility for violence against civilians. However, states...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2021
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In: |
Terrorism and political violence
Year: 2021, Volume: 33, Issue: 3, Pages: 466-488 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Keywords: |
Summary: | With an increased focus on the role of pro-government militias in understanding intra-state conflict, scholars have primarily argued that states use militias as a proxy of the government because of low capacity or as a means of avoiding responsibility for violence against civilians. However, states with both high capacity and a willingness to commit violence against civilians have also relied upon pro-government militias in counterinsurgency operations. This paper argues that states involved in enduring interstate rivalries are more likely to use pro-government militias in order to reserve conventional military forces for potential conflict with their rival. Based on a case study of India’s Kashmir insurgency and logit analysis of pro-government militia data from 1981 to 2001, the findings provide empirical support for this theory and are robust to alternative measures and model specifications. |
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ISSN: | 1556-1836 |
DOI: | 10.1080/09546553.2018.1548353 |