Institutional anomie and cross-national differences in incarceration

Messner and Rosenfeld's (2007) institutional anomie theory (IAT) has mainly been applied by criminologists to explain crime rates at various aggregate levels. However, Messner and Rosenfeld also suggest that the same social and cultural forces that lead to high crime may explain differences in...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Weiss, Douglas B. (Author) ; Santos, Mateus Rennó (Author) ; Testa, Alexander (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Published: 2020
In: Criminology
Year: 2020, Volume: 58, Issue: 3, Pages: 454-484
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)
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Summary:Messner and Rosenfeld's (2007) institutional anomie theory (IAT) has mainly been applied by criminologists to explain crime rates at various aggregate levels. However, Messner and Rosenfeld also suggest that the same social and cultural forces that lead to high crime may explain differences in punishment, although this latter proposition has yet to be subject to empirical testing. Using a variety of data sources for 41 countries measuring various structural and cultural configurations, in this study we assess the extent to which IAT can explain cross-national differences in incarceration. Our results indicate that the strength of the economic institution and the extent of institutional imbalance reflecting a dominant economic institution are positively associated with incarceration rates when the national culture is characterized by individualism, a competitive achievement orientation, or both. A national culture characterized by both collectivism and a cooperative achievement orientation, however, serves as a buffer against the punitive effects of an institutional imbalance that favors the economy. Our results are discussed in the context of the extant IAT literature and future research on cross-national incarceration.
ISSN:1745-9125
DOI:10.1111/1745-9125.12242