Nudging and the choice architecture of offending decisions
Deterring crime is often considered to be a process of information transmission (e.g., Geerken & Gove, 1975). Economic notions on incentives and choice have meshed well with this perspective (Becker, 1968; Matsueda, 2013). Behavioral economics, however, represents a source of further insights on...
Authors: | ; |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | German |
Published: |
2019
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In: |
Criminology & public policy
Year: 2019, Volume: 18, Issue: 4, Pages: 823-839 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Keywords: |
Summary: | Deterring crime is often considered to be a process of information transmission (e.g., Geerken & Gove, 1975). Economic notions on incentives and choice have meshed well with this perspective (Becker, 1968; Matsueda, 2013). Behavioral economics, however, represents a source of further insights on offender decision‐making, particularly regarding information transmission to promote conformity. Pogarsky, Roche, and Pickett (2018) reviewed behavioral economic studies of offender decision‐making in criminology. In their review, they focused on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a behavioral economic model of decision‐making. More recently, Kahneman (2003, 2011) highlighted the dual‐process nature of behavioral economics, and Thaler and Sunstein (2009) elaborated some principles of nudging. These notions underscore dimensions of offending decisions beyond the perceived costs, risks, and benefits of crime. |
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ISSN: | 1745-9133 |
DOI: | 10.1111/1745-9133.12470 |