-->

The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: a laboratory investigation

Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Veldhuizen, Roel
Contributors: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (Other)
Format: Electronic Book
Language:English
Published: Berlin [Verlag nicht ermittelbar] 2013
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Subito Delivery Service: Order now.
Keywords:
Description
Summary:Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise. (author's abstract)
Physical Description:41 S.