Determinants of judicial dissent in contexts of extreme institutional instability: the case of Ecuador's constitutional court = Determinanten von gerichtlichen Abweichungen in Kontexten extremer institutionellen Instabilität: der Fall des Verfassungsgerichts in Ecuador

"This article identifies the variables that explain the dissenting legal vote in courts that operate under conditions of extreme institutional instability. Drawing on three logistic regression models, this article proposes that judges' ideological preferences constitute a good predictor of...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:  
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Basabe-Serrano, Santiago (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 2014
In:In: Journal of Politics in Latin America 6(2014), 1, Seite 83-107
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
Schlagwörter:
Ecuador
Gericht
Gerichtsentscheidung
Gerichtsverfahren
Gerichtsverhandlung
Kontextanalyse
Strategie
Stabilität
Institution
Institutionalisierung
Wahl
Wahlergebnis
Politische Einstellung
Andenraum
Entwicklungsland
Südamerika
Lateinamerika
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:"This article identifies the variables that explain the dissenting legal vote in courts that operate under conditions of extreme institutional instability. Drawing on three logistic regression models, this article proposes that judges' ideological preferences constitute a good predictor of the dissenting vote. Contrary to the classic argument, which indicates that the instability of judges encourages strategic voting, this article argues that this relationship can be demonstrated only up to a certain point - that is, until an exponential increase in institutional instability leads the judges to vote sincerely, even when this means being part of a minority or 'losing' coalition." (author's abstract)