RT Article
T1 Explaining the failure of Mexico's National Commission of Human Rights (ombudsman's office) after democratization: elections, incentives, and unaccountability in the Mexican Senate
JF Human rights review
VO 13
IS 4
SP 473
OP 495
A1 Finkel, Jodi S.
LA English
YR 2012
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/732610001
AB Mexico’s ombudsman’s office (the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH)), established in 1990 by a nondemocratic government, posed no threat to the then ruling party. Counter to expectations, even after Mexico democratized in 2000, the CNDH remained unwilling to challenge officials for human rights violations. I argue that this is because the ombudsman (the head of the CNDH) is chosen by Mexican Senators who are not accountable—due to secret voting and a prohibition on reelection—to the Mexican public. While civil society wanted a powerful ombudsman, the three main parties did not. Ignoring the public, Senators responded to their parties and appointed a compliant individual to serve as ombudsman, thereby ensuring that the CNDH would not challenge those who held political power. The paper suggests that where accountability institutions, such as human rights offices, are chosen by unaccountable actors (in this case the Mexican Senate), the development of such accountability institutions will be limited.
NO Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 493-495
K1 Ombudsman's office
K1 CNDH
K1 Mexico
K1 Senate
K1 Human Rights
K1 Accountability
DO 10.1007/s12142-012-0233-3