Penalty effect of China's Plea Leniency System: Evidence from theft cases
While there is broad consensus regarding the existence of a plea-trial sentencing disparity, there remains debate over whether the disparity reflects only a plea discount or also includes a trial penalty. The evolution of China's criminal justice system provides a unique natural experiment for...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
International journal of law, crime and justice
Year: 2025, Volume: 82, Pages: 1-19 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Keywords: |
| Summary: | While there is broad consensus regarding the existence of a plea-trial sentencing disparity, there remains debate over whether the disparity reflects only a plea discount or also includes a trial penalty. The evolution of China's criminal justice system provides a unique natural experiment for disentangling the underlying sources of this disparity. An empirical analysis of China's 442,873 theft case judgments between 2014 and 2020 reveals that compared to pre-implementation, defendants who do not plead guilty are subject to a 5.3 %-6.3 % increase in their custodial sentences, more fines, and a reduced probability of receiving probation. Further analysis reveals that the penalty effect is associated with the severity of the crime and processing efficiency. Within the framework of focal concerns theory, one possible explanation is that defendants who refuse to plead guilty are perceived as more dangerous, culpable, and less amenable to rehabilitation, while demands for efficiency and performance appraisal function as significant practical constraints. Our findings enable a deeper understanding of China's Plea Leniency System and the nature of plea-trial sentencing disparity in the trial-avoiding mechanism. |
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| ISSN: | 1756-0616 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2025.100769 |
