The Oslo and Utøya terrorist attack, 22 July 2011
The 2011 Norway terrorist attack consisted of two distinct sequential lone wolf occurrences against the government, the civilian population, and a Workers’ Youth League (AUF)–run summer camp in the Oslo region on 22 July 2011, claiming a total of 77 lives. The attack with a detonated car bomb in the...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
Routledge international handbook of policing crises and emergencies
Year: 2025, Pages: 485-499 |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Summary: | The 2011 Norway terrorist attack consisted of two distinct sequential lone wolf occurrences against the government, the civilian population, and a Workers’ Youth League (AUF)–run summer camp in the Oslo region on 22 July 2011, claiming a total of 77 lives. The attack with a detonated car bomb in the centre of Oslo, and the ensuing killing spree on the camp at Utøya, was exceptional not only for the Nordic countries but also in general. The perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, coming from a well-to-do Oslo family, had gone through a prolonged radicalisation process, as evidenced by his so-called manifesto with an extreme nationalistic right-wing ideological content. The act was carried out after extensive planning and preparations, where Breivik constructed the explosive device; obtained firearms, ammunition, and protective gear; and acquired a van for the bomb and used another car as an escape vehicle. His attack began with exploding the car bomb in the garage at the governmental quarters, severely damaging the buildings, killing 8 and injuring 200 persons. Breivik continued to Utøya, an island 38 km from Oslo, where the camp for young members of the social democratic party took place. Masked as a police officer, Breivik arrived by ferry. With his semi-automatic Ruger Storm rifle and Glock pistol, he shot 69 persons to death and injured 33. Slightly more than an hour after the massacre began, Breivik, without making resistance, was arrested by officers from the national SWAT team that had travelled from Oslo. While the police organisation’s actions initially were characterised by confusion and delay, the rescue work at the scene of the attack was conducted swiftly and with adequate resources. The attack instantly became a national trauma. Soon after the incident, a committee was appointed to in-depth describe and analyse the attack. After only a year, the extensive inquest ‘Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen’ (NOU 2012:14) was published. Several other enquiries were conducted, for example, on Norwegian Police Security Service’s activities. In the present chapter, the conclusions from the national evaluation will be presented. Further, numerous health-related national studies have also been undertaken. Based on this, major questions for our chapter will be: Were there shortcomings in the police response that could have been avoided by better procedures and organisation? What impact had the attack on the planned major police reform? Was the 22 July attack an unavoidable forewarning failure? Was it a result of a genuinely unpredictable threat, or were there any identifiable indications present? Other themes will be the health perspective with consequences primarily for the victims, but also for first responders, that is, ambulance personnel, rescue workers from the fire brigade, and police personnel. |
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| Item Description: | Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 499 |
| ISBN: | 9781032207872 |
