Broker capitalism, pandemic profiteering, and UK financial scandals: how consultancy firms leverage public money, defy regulation, and help the rich
British governments frequently profess commitment to fighting corruption yet the UK’s financial services industry facilitates crony capitalism and London remains a leading global centre for money laundering. This contradiction arises partly from the growing influence of private consultancy firms ove...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Print Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| En: |
Compliance, defiance, and 'dirty' luxury
Año: 2024, Páginas: 63-89 |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
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| 520 | |a British governments frequently profess commitment to fighting corruption yet the UK’s financial services industry facilitates crony capitalism and London remains a leading global centre for money laundering. This contradiction arises partly from the growing influence of private consultancy firms over government. Using two case studies of scandals during the Covid-19 pandemic, I illustrate how private firms leverage public funds. The first concerns the supply chain finance company Greensill Capital and its lobbyist, former UK Prime Minister and Foreign Minister David Cameron. The second concerns the government’s ‘fast lane’ procurement policy which saw vast sums of money lost, stolen, or wasted on contracts awarded to Conservative Party allies. Strangely, none of these actions were technically illegal. Drawing on anthropological approaches to corruption and theories of broker capitalism I ask, what made these scandals possible? I conclude that performative anti-corruption combined with weak regulations and deliberate blurring of the public/private boundary effectively legalise corrupt financial practices. | ||
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