The (In)Stability of Punishment Preferences: Implications for Empirical Desert

Are public preferences for the type or amount of punishment stable? Instability over short periods would complicate empirical desert by undercutting the value of public preferences as policy guides. Using longitudinal, cross-national survey data from Central Europe, we examined within-person stabili...

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VerfasserInnen: Uhl, Andrzej (Verfasst von) ; Pickett, Justin T. (Verfasst von)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 2025
In: The British journal of criminology
Jahr: 2025, Band: 65, Heft: 4, Seiten: 878-897
Online-Zugang: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
Schlagwörter:
Public Opinion
Punishment
Sentencing
Punitiveness
Noise
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Are public preferences for the type or amount of punishment stable? Instability over short periods would complicate empirical desert by undercutting the value of public preferences as policy guides. Using longitudinal, cross-national survey data from Central Europe, we examined within-person stability in punishment preferences along several dimensions: type, amount, and rank order. Individual-level instability was common; respondents frequently changed their punishment preferences across waves. In the aggregate, public opinion was more stable. Our findings support the ‘qualified public input’ model of policy making—aggregate preferences should provide loose guidance for policymakers, with individual-level instability suggesting the ‘latitude of acceptance’ or ‘zone of acquiescence’. Better-educated respondents exhibited more preference stability, thus greater weight should be given to informed public opinion.
ISSN:1464-3529
DOI:10.1093/bjc/azae088