RT Article
T1 An Economic Perspective on Terrorism and Counterterrorism
JF Terrorism and political violence
VO 37
IS 1
SP 56
OP 72
A1 Sandler, Todd 1946-
LA English
YR 2025
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/191510078X
AB This occasional-series paper offers an economic perspective on the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. At the outset, the paper identifies how the economic perspective enriches terrorism analysis by stressing rational choice of myriad agents (e.g., the terrorist groups, their supporters, and targeted governments) subject to constraints. Game-theoretic strategic rational choice allows allied and adversarial agents to incorporate the responses of others into their interdependent choices. Economists’ theoretical paradigms are judged by their success in predicting agents’ behavior and informing effective policies. Since 9/11, many political scientists, operation researchers, sociologists, and others applied economic methods to their study of terrorism. To illustrate selected applications of the economic approach, the paper considers findings from economic studies on bargaining and making concessions during hostage incidents, judging the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies, identifying the economic consequences of terrorism, and finding adequate identification strategies in empirical studies. Future directions and some shortcomings of the economic approach complete the study.
K1 empirical identification strategies
K1 economic consequences of terrorist attacks
K1 concessions in hostage incidents
K1 rationality and terrorism
K1 Economic approach
DO 10.1080/09546553.2023.2259992