Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption
Both generalizations about "Asian corruption", and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and within Asian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2008
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| In: |
Crime, law and social change
Year: 2008, Volume: 49, Issue: 3, Pages: 205-223 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Summary: | Both generalizations about "Asian corruption", and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and within Asian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutional settings, create four distinctive syndromes of corruption, each with its own set of implications for relationships between wealth and power. Japan is an example of "influence markets" in which private interests buy or rent influence over relatively specific policy outcomes within a strong state. Korea is a case of "elite cartels", in which collusion and corrupt incentives enable several kinds of elites to cooperate in governing, enriching themselves, and resisting rising political competition. The Philippines is marked by "oligarchs and clans", with powerful families and their entourages plundering a weak state in a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. China experiences "official mogul" corruption, in which officials abuse state power with impunity, although that process is becoming increasingly fragmented. The four syndromes may help us understand why corruption and rapid growth have coexisted in some, but not all, Asian states for long periods of time, and may also help us understand why some of those states will adapt to new global realities only with some difficulty. They also show how "consensus"-driven reforms emanating from the west may not only be ineffective, but may actually make matters worse. |
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| Item Description: | Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 220-223 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0751 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10611-007-9095-z |