Reputations and corporate malfeasance: collusive networks in financial statement fraud
The prevailing theory used by economists to explain why more corporations do not engage in fraud focuses on the role of board members, auditors and banks in controlling corporate conduct and the "reputational penalties" that may be imposed on them if they fail to do so. In this view, beyon...
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2009
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| En: |
Crime, law and social change
Año: 2009, Volumen: 51, Número: 3/4, Páginas: 365-382 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
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