I'd Rather be Hanged for a Sheep than a Lamb The Unintended Consequences of 'Three-Strikes' Laws

Strong sentences are common "tough on crime" tool used to reduce the incentives for individuals to participate in criminal activity. However, the design of such policies often ignores other margins along which individuals interested in participating in crime may adjust. I use California�...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Radha Iyengar (Author)
Format: Electronic Book
Language:English
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
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