Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence

The standard economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent (type-I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type-II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, los...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:  
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Luca Stanca (VerfasserIn)
Beteiligte: Matteo Rizzolli
Medienart: Elektronisch Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Online-Zugang: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
Schlagwörter:

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a22000002c 4500
001 1866335529
003 DE-627
005 20250207054835.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 231019nuuuuuuuuxx |||||o 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)1866335529 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1866335529 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 2,1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Luca Stanca  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a The standard economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent (type-I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type-II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, loss-aversion, or differential sensitivity to procedural fairness, type-I errors can have a larger effect on deterrence than type-II errors. We test these predictions with an experiment where participants make a decision on whether to steal from other individuals, being subject to different probabilities of judicial errors. The results indicate that both types of judicial errors have a large and significant impact on deterrence, but these effects are not symmetric. An increase in the probability of type-I errors has a larger negative impact on deterrence than an equivalent increase in the probability of type-II errors. This asymmetry is largely explained by risk aversion and, to a lesser extent, type-I error aversion.Judicial errors, criminal procedure, procedural fairness, experimental economics, law and economics, crime, deterrence 
650 4 |a Research 
700 1 |a Matteo Rizzolli  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
856 4 0 |u https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6325315.pdf  |x Verlag  |z kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mkri 
951 |a BO 
ELC |a 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4392981258 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1866335529 
LOK |0 005 20231019043713 
LOK |0 008 231019||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-2619)CORE2513219 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-2619  |c DE-627  |d DE-2619 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-2619 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a core 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-krimdoka001.raw