On Probation. An Experimental Analysis

Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:  
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Bernd Irlenbusch (Autor)
Otros Autores: Sebastian Kube ; Heike Hennig-Schmidt ; Christoph Engel
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Acceso en línea: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Palabras clave:

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a22000002c 4500
001 1866332937
003 DE-627
005 20250207054830.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 231019nuuuuuuuuxx |||||o 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)1866332937 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1866332937 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 2,1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Bernd Irlenbusch  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a On Probation. An Experimental Analysis 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers contribute less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically those not punished themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately.probation, recidivism, public goods, punishment, experimental economics 
650 4 |a Research 
700 1 |a Sebastian Kube  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Heike Hennig-Schmidt  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Christoph Engel  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
856 4 0 |u https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6585935.pdf  |x Verlag  |z kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mkri 
951 |a BO 
ELC |a 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4392978664 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1866332937 
LOK |0 005 20231019043708 
LOK |0 008 231019||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-2619)CORE2676265 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-2619  |c DE-627  |d DE-2619 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-2619 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a core 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-krimdoka001.raw