Rethinking Judicial Activism Ideology: the Nigerian Experience of the Extent and Limits of Legislative-Judicial Interactions

Authoritarian governments are by their very nature unconstitutional. Such government thinks of themselves as above the law, and therefore sees no necessity for separation of powers or representative governance. Constitutional democracy on the other hand, is however based on the notion of people’s so...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:  
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Imam, Ibrahim (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2014
En:Año: 2014
Acceso en línea: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a22000002c 4500
001 1866326104
003 DE-627
005 20250121054904.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 231019s2014 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)1866326104 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1866326104 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 2,1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Imam, Ibrahim  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Rethinking Judicial Activism Ideology: the Nigerian Experience of the Extent and Limits of Legislative-Judicial Interactions 
264 1 |c 2014 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Authoritarian governments are by their very nature unconstitutional. Such government thinks of themselves as above the law, and therefore sees no necessity for separation of powers or representative governance. Constitutional democracy on the other hand, is however based on the notion of people’s sovereignty, which is to be exercised in limited manner by a representative government. Accordingly, judicial activism in this paper is employed to establish the theory of popular participation of courts in the decision making processes through settlement of disputes, interpretation or construction of laws, determination of propriety of legislations, legislative and execution actions within the doctrine of separation of powers for the purpose of enforcement of the limitations in government on constitutional ground. This paper thus examines the concept of judicial activism, its legitimacy and as a mechanism for providing checks and balances in the Nigerian government. The paper demonstrates a game theory of judicial legislative interaction within their function and contends that the notion of judicial supremacy does not hold water because the legislature always has the second chance of invalidating the judgment of courts exercising the legitimate powers. The paper concludes that judicial activism in these countries is a veritable tool in advancing the compliance with the rule of laws on the ground of the Constitution. Keywords: Judicial activism, separation of powers, checks and balances, democrac 
856 4 0 |u https://core.ac.uk/download/234689801.pdf  |x Verlag  |z kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mkri 
951 |a BO 
ELC |a 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 439297183X 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1866326104 
LOK |0 005 20231019043659 
LOK |0 008 231019||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-2619)CORE70350589 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-2619  |c DE-627  |d DE-2619 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-2619 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a core 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-krimdoka001.raw