RT Article
T1 Why voters do not throw the rascals out?: a conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption
JF Crime, law and social change
VO 60
IS 5
SP 471
OP 502
A1 De Sousa, Luís 1973-
A2 Moriconi Bezerra, Marcelo
LA English
YR 2013
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/185403183X
AB One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.
NO Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 497-502
K1 Corrupt Practice
K1 Liberal Democrat Party
K1 Moral Cost
K1 Party System
K1 Political Corruption
DO 10.1007/s10611-013-9483-5