Why voters do not throw the rascals out?: a conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption

One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductor...

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Autor principal: De Sousa, Luís (Autor)
Otros Autores: Moriconi Bezerra, Marcelo
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2013
En: Crime, law and social change
Año: 2013, Volumen: 60, Número: 5, Páginas: 471-502
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Palabras clave:
Corrupt Practice
Liberal Democrat Party
Moral Cost
Party System
Political Corruption
Descripción
Sumario:One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.
Notas:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 497-502
ISSN:1573-0751
DOI:10.1007/s10611-013-9483-5