Sources of tolerance towards corrupted politicians in Greece: the role of trade offs and individual benefits

Reelection of corrupted politicians points to a problem of democratic accountability. Voters do have the chance to ‘throw the rascals out’, but they do not take it. Employing a survey experiment, we test two popular explanations of why Greek voters fail to effectively sanction corrupt politicians. O...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Konstantinidis, Iannis (Author) ; Xezonakis, Georgios (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Published: 2013
In: Crime, law and social change
Year: 2013, Volume: 60, Issue: 5, Pages: 549-563
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Keywords:
Collective Benefit
Corrupt Activity
Democratic Accountability
Political Corruption
Tangible Benefit