RT Article
T1 Strategic and transactional costs of corruption: perspectives from Vietnamese firms
JF Crime, law and social change
VO 65
IS 4/5
SP 351
OP 374
A1 Thang Van Nguyen
A2 Ho, Bao D.
A2 Le, Canh Quang
A2 Hung Viet Nguyen
LA English
YR 2016
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1853809764
AB Focusing on Vietnam, this article explores what costs and benefits a firm may get when it engages in corrupt activities. The research employs three theoretical perspectives, namely institutional, rent-seeking and resource-based theories, to shed light on different types of costs and benefits of corruption at the firm level, using a combination of case studies and quantitative methods. The analysis addresses different types of costs and benefits of corruption for firms. The quantitative analysis (supplemented by qualitative interviews) draws on samples of Vietnamese firms from the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) and the General Statistics Office’s firm surveys in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Results show that firms engage in corrupt activities primarily to follow the ‘rules of the game’. Commonly accepted benefits of corruption such as transactional benefits (i.e., better administrative services) or access to business opportunities hold true only for certain firms. On the other hand, corruption has harmful effects on a firm’s strategic capability by eroding the integrity culture, demotivating innovation and risking the firm’s reputation. These harmful effects are normally hidden and not well-recognized by firms.
NO Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 373-374
K1 Enterprise Survey
K1 Informal Cost
K1 Informal Payment
K1 Technical Inefficiency
K1 Young Firm
DO 10.1007/s10611-016-9609-7