RT Article
T1 An ounce of prevention: opportunity structures for white-collar crime in environmental markets
JF Crime, law and social change
VO 67
IS 2
SP 133
OP 151
A1 Gibbs, Carole
A2 Pugh, Denzel
LA English
YR 2017
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1853777331
AB Markets, in which participants are given a right to pollute that can be bought and sold, are an increasingly popular form of environmental regulation. The bulk of research in this area focuses on market implementation, efficiency, and effectiveness, but merely notes the need for strong government oversight. Despite large-scale instances of fraud in several markets, detailed understanding of what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will effectively protect market participants is lacking. Research on criminal opportunities is primarily limited to a few studies of the European carbon market. In the following paper, we begin to fill this gap in the literature. We draw upon Benson and colleagues’ extensions of routine activities and situational crime prevention theories to examine how business systems, processes, and networks increase or reduce opportunities for white-collar crime. Specifically, we assess whether these reconceptualized opportunity theories explain the differing levels of known white-collar crime in two domestic markets: the United States Acid Rain Program and the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard Program. Implications for theory and practice will be discussed.
NO Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 149-151
K1 ARP
K1 Environmental Crime
K1 Opportunity Theory
K1 RFS
K1 RINs
K1 white-collar crime
DO 10.1007/s10611-016-9667-x