RT Article
T1 Corruption in public procurement: entrepreneurial coalition building
JF Crime, law and social change
VO 66
IS 3
SP 291
OP 311
A1 Hudon, Pierre-André
A2 Garzón, César
LA English
YR 2016
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1853768154
AB This article presents a comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of procurement corruption. It argues that corruption in public procurement can be explained by the creation and development of "corrupt procurement coalitions" (CPCs). Functioning as a network built by corruption entrepreneurs seeking to "milk" the procurement process, a CPC must accomplish three interrelated tasks to succeed: 1) identifying which members to include and organizing interactions of said members, 2) generating and redistributing benefits, and 3) evading internal and external control. CPCs are structured in an inner/peripheral configuration, where the inner network controls the core activities, and the peripheral networks can be activated at will when illegal tasks need to be externalized.
NO Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 308-311
K1 Discretionary Power
K1 Economic Rent
K1 Organize Crime
K1 Procurement Process
K1 Public Procurement
DO 10.1007/s10611-016-9628-4