Corruption in public procurement: entrepreneurial coalition building

This article presents a comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of procurement corruption. It argues that corruption in public procurement can be explained by the creation and development of "corrupt procurement coalitions" (CPCs). Functioning as a network built by corruption entre...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Hudon, Pierre-André (Autor)
Otros Autores: Garzón, César
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2016
En: Crime, law and social change
Año: 2016, Volumen: 66, Número: 3, Páginas: 291-311
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Palabras clave:
Discretionary Power
Economic Rent
Organize Crime
Procurement Process
Public Procurement
Descripción
Sumario:This article presents a comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of procurement corruption. It argues that corruption in public procurement can be explained by the creation and development of "corrupt procurement coalitions" (CPCs). Functioning as a network built by corruption entrepreneurs seeking to "milk" the procurement process, a CPC must accomplish three interrelated tasks to succeed: 1) identifying which members to include and organizing interactions of said members, 2) generating and redistributing benefits, and 3) evading internal and external control. CPCs are structured in an inner/peripheral configuration, where the inner network controls the core activities, and the peripheral networks can be activated at will when illegal tasks need to be externalized.
Notas:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 308-311
Descripción Física:Illustrationen
ISSN:1573-0751
DOI:10.1007/s10611-016-9628-4