RT Article
T1 Accounting for turbulence in the Colombian underworld
JF Trends in organized crime
VO 22
IS 2
SP 166
OP 186
A1 Krakowski, Krzysztof
A2 Zubiría, Gladys
LA English
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1819697207
AB Organized crime groups (OCGs) fight against each other even if it harms their businesses and exposes them to law enforcement authorities. Why do some groups refrain from fighting, while others operate in the incessantly violent underworld? To explain this puzzle, we propose that the underworld conflict is related to the strategies of extra-legal governance adopted by OCGs. We suggest that such strategies have origins in the availability of resources within the groups reach at their entrance into the underworld. More specifically, OCGs with access to easily extractable resources develop limited governance, which leaves them vulnerable to internal and external challenges. OCGs without access to easily extractable resources invest in extended governance, reducing their risk of underworld conflict. This article illustrates this hypothesis in the comparative case study of the Colombian organized crime, supported by new quantitative data.
NO Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 183-186
K1 Organized Crime
K1 Violence
K1 Turbulence
K1 Extra-legal governance
K1 Colombia
DO 10.1007/s12117-018-9330-2