Accounting for turbulence in the Colombian underworld

Organized crime groups (OCGs) fight against each other even if it harms their businesses and exposes them to law enforcement authorities. Why do some groups refrain from fighting, while others operate in the incessantly violent underworld? To explain this puzzle, we propose that the underworld confl...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Krakowski, Krzysztof (Author) ; Zubiría, Gladys (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Published: 4 March 2018
In: Trends in organized crime
Year: 2019, Volume: 22, Issue: 2, Pages: [166]-186
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)
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