RT Article
T1 The organization of Danish gangs: a transaction cost approach
JF Trends in organized crime
VO 24
IS 3
SP 361
OP 377
A1 Sløk-Madsen, Stefan Kirkegaard
A2 Skarbek, David
A2 Hansen, Andreas
A2 Rezaei, Alexander
LA English
YR 2021
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1767697708
AB How do criminal groups organize, operate, and govern in Denmark? We argue that organized crime groups face governance challenges in the form of principal-agent problems and transaction costs. Based on interviews with law enforcement officers, former gang members, and prisoners, we provide evidence for how people involved in crime respond to these organizational dilemmas. We find that the more severe the principal-agent problem, the more gangs vet possible members during recruitment. We also find that as transaction costs rise, people who are engaged in illicit activities that are more complicated will rely more on internal structure and centralization. Our findings support existing rational choice theories of criminal organizations.
K1 Rational Choice Theory
K1 Outlaw motorcycle gangs
K1 Organized crime groups
DO 10.1007/s12117-021-09409-y