RT Article
T1 Plea Bargaining and the Miscarriage of Justice
JF Journal of quantitative criminology
VO 37
IS 1
SP 35
OP 72
A1 Beenstock, Michael 1946-
A1 Guetzkow, Joshua A. 1974-
A1 Kamenetsky-Yadan, Shir
A2 Guetzkow, Joshua A. 1974-
A2 Kamenetsky-Yadan, Shir
LA English
YR 2021
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1760647616
AB We examine whether, on average, plea bargaining encourages guilty pleas among defendants who are factually innocent.
K1 Plea bargains
K1 Shadow trial
K1 Innocence effect
K1 Selection Bias
K1 Bivariate probit
DO 10.1007/s10940-019-09441-w