RT Book
T1 Militant competition: how terrorists and insurgents advertise with violence and how they can be stopped
A1 Conrad, Justin
A2 Spaniel, William
LA English
PP Cambridge New York, NY Port Melbourne New Delhi Singapore
PB Cambridge University Press
YR 2021
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1760524980
AB Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and test the model's implications with statistical analysis and case studies. A series of model extensions allow the authors to incorporate the full range of strategic actors, focusing in particular on government efforts to counter and deter violence. The results indicate that the direct effects of competition are not as clear as they may seem, and interventions to alter competitive incentives may backfire if states are not careful. This is a timely contribution to a growing body of political economy research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence.
NO Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 239-255, Register
CN HV6431
SN 9781108834186
SN 9781108994538
K1 Terrorism : Public opinion
K1 Terrorism : Decision making : Mathematical models
K1 Terrorist organizations : Public opinion
K1 Political Violence : Public opinion
K1 Political Violence : Decision making : Mathematical models
K1 Terrorism : Prevention : Social aspects
K1 Competition
K1 Endogenous growth (Economics)
K1 Terrorismus
K1 Rebell
K1 Konkurrent
K1 Finanzierung
K1 Gewalt
K1 Spaltung
K1 Fallstudie
K1 Statistische Analyse
K1 POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General