RT Article
T1 A Security Paradox. The Influence Of Governance-Type Organized Crime Over the Surrounding Criminal Environment
JF The British journal of criminology
VO 60
IS 4
SP 970
OP 993
A1 Aziani, Alberto
A2 Campedelli, Gian Maria
A2 Favarin, Serena
LA English
YR 2020
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1724630857
AB This study empirically demonstrates how governance-type organized crime groups (OCGs) operate as an enforcer against volume crimes in the communities they control and argues that their ability to mitigate volume crimes forms an integral component of controlling their territory in the long term. This is because the costs incurred from deterring other crimes are offset by the tangible and intangible revenues that it facilitates. Indeed, combating volume crimes fosters an environment in which OCGs can conduct their activities unfettered by other criminals and law enforcement agencies, safeguard those businesses that pay them protection and curry favour amongst the population. Consequently, the present study verifies the validity of the security governance paradigm by conducting an econometric analysis of 11 different volume crimes.
K1 Security governance
K1 Volume crimes
K1 Governance-type OC
K1 Italian mafias
K1 Extra-legal governance
K1 Crime specificity
DO 10.1093/bjc/azz087