Nudging and the choice architecture of offending decisions

Deterring crime is often considered to be a process of information transmission (e.g., Geerken & Gove, 1975). Economic notions on incentives and choice have meshed well with this perspective (Becker, 1968; Matsueda, 2013). Behavioral economics, however, represents a source of further insights on...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Pogarsky, Greg (Author)
Contributors: Herman, Shaina
Format: Electronic Article
Language:German
Published: 2019
In: Criminology & public policy
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)
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Keywords:
Behavioral economics
Decision-making
Deterrence
Dual process
Nudge
Description
Summary:Deterring crime is often considered to be a process of information transmission (e.g., Geerken & Gove, 1975). Economic notions on incentives and choice have meshed well with this perspective (Becker, 1968; Matsueda, 2013). Behavioral economics, however, represents a source of further insights on offender decision‐making, particularly regarding information transmission to promote conformity. Pogarsky, Roche, and Pickett (2018) reviewed behavioral economic studies of offender decision‐making in criminology. In their review, they focused on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a behavioral economic model of decision‐making. More recently, Kahneman (2003, 2011) highlighted the dual‐process nature of behavioral economics, and Thaler and Sunstein (2009) elaborated some principles of nudging. These notions underscore dimensions of offending decisions beyond the perceived costs, risks, and benefits of crime.
ISSN:1745-9133
DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12470