The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: a laboratory investigation

Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Veldhuizen, Roel (VerfasserIn)
Beteiligte: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (BeteiligteR)
Medienart: Elektronisch Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Berlin [Verlag nicht ermittelbar] 2013
In:Jahr: 2013
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Schlagwörter:
Einkommenseffekt
Korruption
Laborexperiment
Lohn
experimentelle Ökonomie
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise. (author's abstract)
Beschreibung:41 S.