RT Book
T1 The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: a laboratory investigation
T2 Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten
A1 Veldhuizen, Roel
LA English
PP Berlin
PB [Verlag nicht ermittelbar]
YR 2013
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1656007304
AB Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise. (author's abstract)
K1 Laborexperiment
K1 Einkommenseffekt
K1 Korruption
K1 Lohn
K1 experimentelle Ökonomie