RT Article
T1 Presidential control of high courts in Latin America: a long-term view (1904-2006)  = Control presidencial de las cortes supremas en América Latina: una mirada histórica (1904-2006)
A1 Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal S.
A2 Castagnola, Andrea
LA English
YR 2009
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1588522903
AB In many Latin American countries the executive branch manipulatesthe composition of the Supreme Court, and judicial independence hasremained elusive. Because high courts can exercise judicial review and influencelower courts, incoming presidents often force the resignation of adversarialjustices or "pack" the courts with friends. One indicator of this problemhas been the high turnover among members of the high courts. In thispaper we offer systematic evidence to compare this problem across countriesand to place this issue in historical perspective. Our analysis covers 11Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, ElSalvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay) between1904 and 2006. We model the entrance of new justices to the SupremeCourt as a function of "natural" (legal and biological) factors, political conditionsempowering the president to reshuffle the Court, and institutionalincentives promoting executive encroachment on the judicia
CN 321 320 301
K1 institutionelle Faktoren
K1 Politische Faktoren
K1 Richter
K1 Präsident
K1 Kontrolle
K1 Politische Kontrolle
K1 Oberster Gerichtshof
K1 Regierungswechsel
K1 Lateinamerika
K1 Political Science
K1 Supreme Courts
K1 Judiciary/ judiciary powers
K1 Judges
K1 Executive/ executive power
K1 Institutions
K1 Ciencia política
K1 Tribunales supremos
K1 Sistema judicial/ poder judicial
K1 Jueces
K1 Rama ejecutiva/ poder ejecutivo
K1 Instituciones
K1 Latin America
K1 América Latina
K1 20. Jahrhundert