Civil asset forfeiture laws and equitable sharing activity by the police
For several decades, critics have argued that civil forfeiture laws create incentives for law enforcement to increase departmental revenue by “policing for profit.” By using data on federal equitable sharing payments to nearly 600 local law enforcement agencies between 2000 and 2012, we examine the...
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| Otros Autores: | ; |
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2018
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| En: |
Criminology & public policy
Año: 2018, Volumen: 17, Número: 1, Páginas: 101-127 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Palabras clave: |
| Sumario: | For several decades, critics have argued that civil forfeiture laws create incentives for law enforcement to increase departmental revenue by “policing for profit.” By using data on federal equitable sharing payments to nearly 600 local law enforcement agencies between 2000 and 2012, we examine the relationship between the characteristics of state forfeiture laws and equitable sharing payments to local agencies. Our results indicate that agencies in states with state laws that are more restrictive or less rewarding to police collect more in federal equitable sharing. This finding supports the critics’ argument that police behavior in regard to forfeiture activities is influenced by the financial rewards and burdens involved. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-9133 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/1745-9133.12341 |