Policing, databases, and surveillance
Databases are full of personal information that law enforcement might find useful. Government access to these databases can be divided into five categories: suspect-driven; profile-driven; event-driven; program-driven and volunteer-driven. This chapter recommends that, in addition to any restriction...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2017
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| In: |
Criminology, criminal justice, law & society
Jahr: 2017, Band: 18, Heft: 3, Seiten: 70-84 |
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Volltext (kostenfrei) |
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| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Schlagwörter: |
| Zusammenfassung: | Databases are full of personal information that law enforcement might find useful. Government access to these databases can be divided into five categories: suspect-driven; profile-driven; event-driven; program-driven and volunteer-driven. This chapter recommends that, in addition to any restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment(which currently are minimal), each type of access should be subject to its own regulatory regime. Suspect-driven access should depend on justification proportionate to the intrusion. Profile-driven access should likewise abide by aproportionality principle but should also be subject to transparency, vetting, and universality restrictions. Event-driven access should be cabined by the time and place of the event. Program-driven access should be authorized by legislationand by regulations publicly arrived-at and evenly applied. Information maintained by institutional fiduciaries should not be volunteered unless necessary to forestall an ongoing or imminent serious wrong. |
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| ISSN: | 2332-886X |